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Corporate Governance in Australia  
Grant Fleming  
he state of corporate governance in Australia has received media and policy 
attention in the last eighteen months as the social and financial implications 
of major corporate collapses come to light.  Most prominent in the local 
financial press have been the investigations of governance irregularities (and 
allegations of illegal management behaviour) in HIH and OneTel, with supporting 
roles from companies such as Harris Scarfe and AMP.  Overseas players in the 
unfolding governance drama have included the US corporations Tyco, Enron and 
Global Crossing. 
Economists have not been active participants in framing the agenda of 
Australian debate on corporate governance.  Indeed, what has been lacking in the 
debate thus far is analysis of the state of corporate governance using the tools and 
concepts familiar to students of economics.  Financial economists, in particular, 
have a rich set of empirical findings that allow us to judge the necessity for and 
likelihood of success of reform options.   
This paper presents a standard principal-agent framework to place the current 
corporate governance debate and policy reforms in context.  This framework is 
used to describe the changes in the Australian corporate governance system over 
the last forty years, and to determine if there are lessons from this experience for 
current reforms.  An examination of how principal-agent relationships between 
shareholders (and other stakeholders) and managers will be affected by the 
recently formulated Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance 
Council ‘Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations’ is provided.  Some speculations on their likely impact on firm 
value and stock market behaviour are offered. 
A Framework for Understanding Corporate Governance 
The level of transaction costs associated with various organisational structures 
provides the conditions under which the owners of the firm choose how to 
organise in such a way as to maximise profit.  Firms as organisational forms (the 
co-location of individuals to produce goods and services) solve coordination and 
information problems associated with contracting over long time periods 
(Williamson, 1971; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  As the firm increases in size, 
the benefits of specialisation lead owners to delegate day-to-day control to 
managers, and oversight of management to the appointed board of directors.  The 
corporate governance of the firm, therefore, entails a set of mechanisms by which 
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the owners of the firm attempt to ensure that managers undertake activities 
consistent with the firm’s goals.  In a world with full information and zero 
transaction costs, management can be contracted to always act in the interests of 
the owners.  However, in practice, the principal-agent relationship between owners 
and managers gives rise to the possibility that managers may act opportunistically 
to improve their welfare at the expense of owners. 
The principal-agent (or agency cost) framework has been adopted by 
financial economists to describe features of the corporate governance system.  
This framework is adopted here in order to describe the key empirical findings of 
the finance literature.  The set of principal-agent relationships that commonly exist 
within the ownership structure and operational basis of the firm are summarised in 
Figure 1 (for a similar approach, see John and Senbet, 1998). 


















At the top of Figure 1, debt holders and equity holders are the major financial 
claimants over the value of the firm.  Debt holders receive the risk-determined 
coupon on the debt obligation.  Equity holders are the residual claimants on firm 
value, and delegate the corporate decision making to specialist managers and the 
board of directors.  The number and type of shareholders varies, from a small 
group of inter-related parties (such as in a family-owned firm), to a large, 
dispersed group of shareholders (such as in a large publicly traded corporation).  
Perhaps the most common ownership structure relevant to the current corporate 
governance debate is the publicly listed firm with dispersed, small shareholders 
and a few substantial minority shareholders (usually institutional investors).   
Agency relationships exist within the firm between senior executive 
management and other employees, depending on its organisational complexity.  
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managers who may ‘side contract’ to further their own interests, rather than that of 
the head office (Gibbons, 1998).  Thus, remuneration design and incentive 
compatibility relate to all levels of the firm, rather than just to the contracts of 
senior executives. 
The firm also has a number of relationships with other stakeholders in the 
normal course of its operations — suppliers, customers and the community.  These 
relationships are illustrated in the bottom half of the diagram.  The extent to which 
management can act opportunistically in its relationships with suppliers and 
customers is limited by the relative power held by each party.  Management may 
alter (‘hold-up’) contracts, or other norms of business, with suppliers or customers 
to further their own ends (not necessarily those of the owners).  The ability to do 
so is determined by the nature of goods and services traded, alternative supplies 
and the value management places on long term reputation versus short term gains 
(Besanko, Dranove and Shanley, 2000).  A key supplier relationship in the 
governance process is the consumption of audit services by the firm.  External 
audits provide third party review of the mechanisms designed to minimise agency 
costs; in particular, audits should ensure that the behaviour of management, the 
board of directors and related parties are in the best interests of equity and debt 
holders and the financial position of the firm is fairly and accurately 
communicated.  Finally, the firm has an agency relationship with the community 
— a social agency relationship — that encompasses responsibilities in terms of 
being a ‘good’ corporate citizen.  Only recently have firms in Australia explicitly 
recognised such a corporate governance relationship (for example in the areas of 
environmental sustainability, land rights, or corporate philanthropy). 
Academic research on corporate governance since the 1980s has increasingly 
directed attention to the relationships in Figure 1, primarily to the relationships 
between financial claimants such as debt holders and equity holders and the firm.  
Financial economics now has a strong sub-field in empirical corporate governance 
that measures the extent to which agency costs vary by ownership structure and 
the type of corporate governance structures employed by firms (or indeed, types of 
corporate governance systems that may vary by country or legal system).  The 
major corporate governance mechanisms found to influence the level of agency 
costs are the ability of directors to oversee the behaviour of management (the 
structure and role of the board of directors), the audit and review process (both 
internal audits and the external audit process undertaken by third parties), the 
design of executive remuneration (aligning interests through incentive-based pay), 
the role of large shareholders to incur monitoring costs and oversee management, 
and the threat of takeover from the market for corporate control.  More generally, 
the link between ‘better’ corporate governance mechanisms and higher firm 
performance has received mixed support (see Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).   
In order to judge the necessity for the new ASX reforms we now examine 
how the principal-agent relationships in Australian firms have changed (if at all) 
over the last forty years (for similar reviews see Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2003 on 
the UK; and Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003 on the US).  Our examination focuses 
on three of the five mechanisms above:  the increases in ownership concentration, 
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the rise in the number of block shareholders, executive and director share 
ownership, and board structure.  The operation of the market for corporate control 
in Australia was a relatively less important constraint on management, at least 
until the 1990s (see Walter, 1984; Brown and Horin, 1986)1.   
Corporate Governance in Australia over the Last Forty Years 
Ownership Concentration 
Separation between ownership and control has been a relatively recent 
characteristic of firms in Australia.  As Ville and Merrett (2000) have argued, 
Australian companies in the first half of the twentieth century were best described 
as ‘family capitalism’ with important director and managerial positions held by a 
close-knit business group.  There is little evidence of hierarchies of salaried 
managers outside the banks, pastoral companies or mining houses.  Indeed, 
Wheelwright’s (1957) a study of the largest 102 companies in Australia in the 
1950s (including financial institutions and subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations) indicated the founding families were in a position to control the 
majority of those companies through their board positions and shareholdings.  
Only one third of domestic companies could be identified as management 
controlled. 
The nature of the separation of ownership from control changed in the second 
half of the twentieth century.  In terms of Figure 1, the relative importance of 
substantial minority shareholders increased and that of small shareholders 
decreased, altering the nature of the review and monitoring of the board of 
directors and management. 
Table 1: Ownership of Shares by Individuals, Companies and 
Institutions 1952 and 1995 
Owner  1952 1995 
 Per cent 
Households/persons 75.6 22.8 
Rest of world - 32.0 
Companies 15.5 8.8 
Life & pension funds - 23.8 
Banks & other - 11.0 
All financial 8.9 - 
Government - 1.5 
Source:  Wheelwright (1957); ASX (1995) 
Table 1 reports data on the percentage of shares owned by various groups in 
1952 and 1995.  Here ownership is measured using information on the number of 
shares, as reported by Wheelwright (1957) for 1952, and the ASX (for 1995).  
                                                          
1  The audit and review process deserves fuller treatment than available here. 
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Individual share owners comprised the largest shareholder type in 1952 (75.6 per 
cent) but had declined to a third in 1995 (22.8 per cent).  This decline in relative 
importance is in spite of the increase in share ownership for Australian households 
since the 1970s (that is, the number of households owning shares has increased but 
their proportion of all shares has decreased).  By contrast, financial institutions 
have risen in importance over the last forty years.  All financial shareholders were 
8.9 per cent of the total in 1952, and 34.8 per cent in 1995 (combining life and 
pension funds, and banks).  Ownership of Australian corporations by overseas 
shareholders is more difficult is ascertain.  Wheelwright’s (1957) study did not 
identify foreign owners as a separate group (foreign owners are included in 
individuals and nominees, or financial categories).  In 1995 foreign owners 
comprised 32.0 per cent of shareholders, and it is reasonable to expect that the 
figure was lower for 1952. 
The aggregate data on ownership in Table 1 does not tell us (in a cross 
sectional sense) how firms have changed over the forty years.  As a first attempt at 
mapping these longer term changes we have collected firm-specific information 
on the largest 50 non-financial firms in Australia for 1964 and 1997 (the firms are 
identified by Ville and Merrett 2000).  Detailed information is available on 
ownership for approximately half of these firms.  In Table 2 we report the 
summary statistics for the percentage of shares owned by the top 20 shareholders, 
top 5 shareholders and largest shareholder for the sample of firms in 1964 and 
1997.  These ownership concentration measures are not ideal, as they include the 
holdings of large financial institutions as monies for pension and life funds.  Thus, 
we know less about the beneficial holdings or voting power of the shares and 
whether substantial minorities are now more prevalent.  Nevertheless, such 
measures are commonly used as a litmus test of ownership concentration in the 
empirical finance literature and are used here. 
Table 2: Ownership Concentration — Select Australian Firms 
Top 20 Top 5 Largest 
1964 1997 1964 1997 1964 1997 
Per cent 
Mean 39.2 65.2 29.9 46.4 15.9 20.5 
Median 30.6 64.5 15.4 44.8 7.3 16.6 
Std dev 26.9 15.8 28.4 15.7 17.9 15.6 
Count 23 23     
Source:  Wheelwright and Miskelly (1967); Connect4 Annual Report Series 
All measurements of ownership concentration reported in Table 2 show 
increases over the period.  The top 20 and top five shareholders in 1964 held, on 
average, 39.2 per cent and 29.9 per cent respectively.  By 1997 the corresponding 
groups held 65.2 per cent and 46.4 per cent.  Also noticeable is that the variation 
in firm experience declined between 1964 and 1997.  The standard deviation of 
top 20 and top five shareholdings fell from 27-28 per cent to 15 per cent.  Thus, in 
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1964 there was a greater dispersion of ownership and firms adopted a range of 
ownership and corporate governance mechanisms to reduce agency issues between 
shareholders, debt holders and managers.  By 1997 the greater concentration 
means that the governance functions are more likely to be undertaken by the same 
groups.  Indeed, one important group — the largest shareholder — increased in 
size, from an average 15.9 per cent of shares in 1964 to 20.5 per cent in 1997.  The 
median shareholding for each ownership concentration is also reported in Table 2 
as a more robust measure.  All median data show at least a doubling in ownership 
concentration for our sample firms.  Top 20 shareholders held 30.6 per cent in 
1964 and 64.5 per cent in 1997; the top 5 shareholders became even more 
important with a rise from 15.4 per cent of shares in 1964 to 44.8 per cent in 1997.  
The largest shareholder also increased their holding from 7.3 per cent to 16.6 per 
cent. 
How did the trends in Tables 1 and 2 impact on the governance structure of 
corporations?  The most likely outcome of the change in type of owner and 
ownership concentration is in the review and monitoring of the board and 
management by shareholders that could incur the transaction costs of information 
collection and regular briefings and meetings.  Individual shareholders usually do 
not have the resources to monitor actively the managers of Australia’s largest 
companies.  Indeed, Wheelwright (1957) concluded that one-third of the 
companies in his sample were ‘in the hands of management, over whom 
shareholders can have little control’.  The diffuse ownership structures of the 
1950s and of later decades, as reported by Wheelwright and Miskelly (1967) for 
1962-64 and Lawriwsky (1978) for 1974-75, meant that managers faced less 
scrutiny than would be the norm in the 1990s.  Companies were the only other 
shareholder type of any importance (15.5 per cent of shares) and typically inter-
company share ownership tended to be supportive of incumbent management.  
Close personal relationships and reputations at the board level often meant that the 
company representatives (as shareholders) would not act in the best interests of the 
smaller individual shareholder when questions of priority arose. 
Financial institutions have the means and incentive to provide closer scrutiny 
of the board and management given that they hold larger blocks of shares (as 
nominees) for their clients.  In 1952 financial institutions held only 8.9 per cent of 
shares.  Wheelwright and Miskelly (1967) later estimated that institutions could, if 
they combined as a single block of like-minded investors (all nominee companies 
acting in unison), control 30.6 per cent of surveyed companies (effectively 
replacing the one-third managerial control).  However, ‘non-action by institutions’ 
meant that managers were not subject to external review from institutions.  By the 
1990s financial institutions had risen in importance to provide a greater 
shareholding block.  Life and pension funds in particular can now communicate a 
strong shareholder view to the board and management.  Whether this has occurred 
is difficult to ascertain, although until very recently most studies have found 
pension funds to be passive in their dealings with firms (see Stapledon, 
Easterbrook, Bennett, and Ramsey, 2000).  As far as we can tell, ownership 
changes have not unambiguously improved corporate governance since the 1950s. 




Share Ownership, Board Characteristics and Blockholders 
The nature of share ownership is one aspect of the principal-agent relationship and 
governance process.  The last forty years has also witnessed changes in three other 
governance mechanisms — the level of share ownership by directors and 
managers, the structure of the board of directors (size and composition), and the 
number and type of block-holders (groups with more than five per cent of shares).  
Recent research has shown that these mechanisms can combine to mitigate agency 
costs in the firm, although debate continues on the effectiveness of each 
mechanism — on managerial share ownership compare McConnell and Servaes 
(1990), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); on board size see Denis and Sarin 
(1999); and on block-holders see Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998). 
Share ownership by key decision makers in the company can be used as a 
corporate governance mechanism to ensure that the interests of all shareholders 
are protected.  Managerial and director shareholding aligns interests on share 
value maximisation and decreases the probability that managers act 
opportunistically or that directors monitor ineffectively.  However, empirical 
evidence provides no definitive answer on whether managerial or director 
shareholding is associated with higher firm value (Demsetz and Villonga, 2001; 
and Craswell, Taylor and Saywell, 1997).  Indeed, it is often the case that the 
design of remuneration packages focus on options, rather than direct 
shareholdings, that induce myopic behaviour by management to the detriment of 
shareholders.  Table 3 shows the share of equity held by directors in the years 
1952, 1962-64 and 1974-75 for samples of Australian firms — there were few 
majority control positions held by directors, and diffuse share ownership was the 
norm. 
Table 3: Share of Equity Held by Directors, 1952-1975 
Directors/Group Per cent 1952 1962-4 1974-5 
Majority >50 -- 8.4 per cent 7.6 per cent 
Minority >10<50 33.3 per cent# 25.8 per cent 42.0 per cent 
Diffuse 0<10 66.6 per cent 65.9 per cent 50.3 per cent 
Sample size  72* 299 157 
Notes: # This figure refers to both minority and majority categories.   
  * ‘Industrials’ only. 
Source:  Merrett (2002) 
Board size and board composition have long been regarded as important 
components of the governance process.  In Figure 1, the board of directors 
monitors management and provides strategic input into the operations of the firm.  
Its ability to undertake these functions effectively depends on its size and 
composition.  Board size is positively associated with company size due to the fact 
that as a firm increases in size and complexity, directors with a variety of human 
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capital skills are needed (Chandler, 1990:232-233; Denis and Sarin, 1999; 
Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999).  Smaller firms have less complex control and 
decision making systems, implying that directors require general managerial skills.  
As the firm increases in size, non-executive and executive directors play important 
roles in monitoring and strategy formulation.  There are costs, however, to larger 
boards.  Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that as board size 
increases it becomes difficult for an additional director to increase value.  A larger 
board negatively affects the amount of time available at typical board meetings 
and has a negative impact on group dynamics by leading to greater formality and 
less frankness and openness in strategic discussion. 
Board composition refers to the number of non-executive and executive 
directors on the board.  Executive directors hold both a board position and a senior 
management or executive position within the company.  Owing to this dual role, 
executive directors have the potential to make a valuable contribution to the board, 
as they are able to bring firm-specific knowledge to board deliberations.  
Notwithstanding the benefits of executive directors, their independence from 
management may be impaired.  Executive directors display greater loyalty to 
management than do their non-executive colleagues, and given their position they 
are subject to greater influence by the company’s CEO than are outside directors.  
The selection and reporting process of executive directors reduces independence, 
as directors are charged with the responsibility for monitoring the performance of 
the CEO and also report to the CEO.  This results in a potential conflict of interest 
for such directors and the presence of too many executive directors on a board 
may invite scepticism about the independence of such a board, especially with 
regards to reviewing the performance of management. 
On the other hand non-executive directors are typically appointed for their 
industry expertise and their decision-making abilities.  The role of these directors 
differs somewhat from that of their executive counterparts in that non-executive 
directors may be undertaking strategic, independent monitoring and representative 
roles (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Despite the fact that the company does not 
employ non-executive directors in other positions, there may be circumstances 
where their independence is threatened.  For example, many authors have 
questioned the independence of outside directors given the dominance of a 
company’s CEO in making such appointments, or directors’ previous connections 
with the firm (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). 
How has the size and composition of boards changed over the last forty years 
in Australia?  Do we find improvements in the corporate governance of boards 
that can be associated with greater independence and resolution of principal-agent 
problems?  Table 4 reports board size for the sample of twenty-three Australian 
firms in 1964 and 1997 (the same sample as in Table 2).  Median board size 
increased from 7 directors to 11 directors between our benchmark years, 
consistent with what we would expect from theory and previous empirical 
evidence. 
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Table 4: Monitoring the Company:  Board Size and Block-holders of 
Select Australian Firms 
 Board Size No.  Block-holder 
 1964 1997 1964 1997 
Mean 7.5 10.4 1.0 4.0 
Median 7.0 11.0 1.0 4.0 
Std dev 2.1 3.0 1.2 1.4 
Sample size   23 23 
Source:  Wheelwright and Miskelly (1967); Connect4 Annual Report Series 
The change in board size, however, tells us little about what may have 
happened to the operation of the board and its governance role over time.  If firms 
increased in size during that period it is difficult to ascertain from board size alone 
whether boards behaved better.  Information on the composition of boards is not 
available for many of Australian firms for earlier years.  We have collected data 
for the six companies that were dominant firms throughout the twentieth century 
to give a longer term perspective on governance patterns.  These firms were 
identified by Ville and Merrett (2000) as corporate leaders in the twentieth 
century; the firms are icons of Australian business history — BHP, CSR, Pacific 
Dunlop, Coca Cola Amatil, Australian Gas Light and Burns Philp.  The list is, of 
course, biased in focusing on large firms that have entrenched positions.  Further, 
there have been important governance changes to several (Pacific Dunlop and 
Burns Philp) in recent years. 
Table 5:  Board Size of Major Australian Firms 
Company 1913 1928 1964 1997 
BHP 7 6 7 12 
CSR 5 5 7 13 
Pacific Dunlop 6 5 11 11 
Coca Cola Amatil 10 10 9 14 
Aust Gas Light  12 6 * 8 
Burns Philp 7 6 * 7 
Notes:  * indicates that data were not available 
Source: Author’s calculations from individual company reports; Wheelwright and 
Miskelly (1967); Connect4 Annual Report Series. 
Examination of these top six firms shows that board size remained relatively 
stable until the 1960s.  Only Pacific Dunlop increased board size substantially by 
1964, most likely as a result of previous mergers and acquisitions.  Smaller boards 
may have worked efficiently between the 1910s and the 1950s as the demands of 
external investors for rigorous oversight and review was low.  Alternatively, the 
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data suggest that these companies were not subjected to high levels of outside 
scrutiny and could persist with CEO (or chairman) appointed boards of limited 
size.  The rise in board size is by no means uniform for these firms.  Board size 
increased at BHP, CSR, Pacific Dunlop, and Coca Cola Amatil, but not for 
Australian Gas Light or Burns Philp.  Table 6 adds further insight by presenting 
composition of the board (the percentage of non-executive directors) for the six 
companies.  All companies initiated a change in composition over the period to 
include a greater number of executive officers on the board. 
Table 6:  Board Composition of Major Australian Firms 
Company 1913 1928 1964 1997 
 Per cent NED 
BHP 100 83 86 67 
CSR 100 100 86 77 
Pacific Dunlop 100 100 73 73 
Coca Cola Amatil 90 100 100 86 
Aust Gas Light 100 100 * 88 
Burns Philp 100 67 * 86 
Notes: * indicates that data were not available 
Source: Author calculations from individual company reports; Wheelwright and Miskelly 
(1967); Connect4 Annual Report Series 
This change suggests that board operation and strategy formulation improved 
as executives played an increasingly important role in board deliberations.  
Noticeable too is the fact that every firm maintained a majority of non-executive 
directors, due in large part to the professionalisation of governance practices in 
large organisations (it is another question whether these directors were 
independent non-executives — anecdotal evidence would suggest that they were 
not).  While only conjecture, we suggest that the rise of a market for professional 
non-executive directors and the increased important of director reputation has 
served these firms well in improving monitoring, decision making and governance 
practices generally (Merrett, 2002). 
The final trend we note from the data above is an increase in the number of 
block-holders.  Table 4 indicates that the importance of block-holders has grown 
between 1964 and 1997, with an average of four substantial shareholders for 1997 
firms.  This is consistent with the increase in ownership concentration in Table 2.  
As stated earlier, block-holders serve an important role in the governance process 
because they are willing to incur the transaction costs associated with monitoring 
companies.  Block-holders often have more specialised resources to devote to 
monitoring shareholdings, and have access to greater levels of information than 
smaller, individual shareholders.  In many cases block-holders are able to engage 
in dialogue with incumbent management over the operations of the firm and adopt 
a ‘voice’ strategy in communicating dissatisfaction with performance (as opposed 
to an ‘exit’ strategy of selling equity positions).  Smaller shareholders can free ride 
Corporate Governance in Australia 
 
205
on the actions of block-holders and enjoy improvements in performance, better 
strategic decision making and greater likelihood of disbursements of excess cash 
(Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler, 1998).  The data in Table 4 suggests that the level 
of external monitoring by block-holders has improved to the benefit of all 
shareholders, although again we provide the caveat that structural change by itself 
is not sufficient to improve corporate governance practices. 
 In summary, an examination of some of the basic features of the 
governance mechanisms of large Australian firms over the last forty years shows 
that corporate governance has changed in nature but not necessarily improved.  
Data on ownership concentration, share ownership by directors, and the size and 
composition of the board of directors certainly suggest that by the 1990s 
Australian managers faced greater scrutiny by a market based corporate 
governance system.  However, structural changes by themselves do not imply 
improved governance and the better resolution of principal-agent conflicts than in 
the past.  The corporate governance ‘crisis’ in the late 1990s provided evidence 
that something more than structure is required to protect shareholders from 
managerial agency behaviour. 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council ‘Principles’ 
The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms have been called into 
question by many commentators recently in the light of overseas experience of 
corporate malfeasance (particularly in the USA), the corporate collapses of major 
listed Australian firms, and the apparently ‘excessive’ remuneration packages and 
termination payouts of senior executives (especially when firms are making 
losses).  It has appeared that despite greater awareness of principal-agent conflicts 
and interest alignment, shareholders are still not protected from governance 
failures. 
In August 2002 the ASX Corporate Governance Council was formed to 
‘develop and deliver an industry-wide, supportable and supported framework for 
corporate governance which could provide a practical guide for listed companies, 
their investors, the wider market and the Australian community’ (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003:Foreword).  The Council comprised representatives 
from 21 stakeholder groups including major investors, firms and professions (see 
ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003:4), and delivered a set of principles 
and best practice recommendations in March 2003.  While it is too early to state 
unequivocally how the principles will impact firm behaviour in the next few years, 
we provide comments and speculations on their effect given what we know about 
the Australian corporate experience of the last forty years and the literature on the 
empirical relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and outcomes. 
The Council’s principles are provided below in abbreviated form: 
 
Principle 1:  Lay solid foundation for management and oversight 




Principle 2:  Structure the board to add value 
• A majority of the board should be independent directors. 
• The chairperson should be an independent director. 
• The roles of chairperson and chief executive officer should not be exercised by 
the same person. 
• The board should establish a nomination committee. 
 
Principle 3:  Promote ethical and responsible decision-making 
• Establish a code of conduct to guide the directors, the chief executive officer 
(or equivalent), the chief financial officer (or equivalent) and any other key 
executives as to (i) the practices necessary to maintain confidence in the 
company’s integrity, (ii) the responsibility and accountability of individuals for 
reporting and investigating reports of unethical practices. 
• Disclose the policy concerning trading in company securities by directors, 
officers and employees. 
 
Principle 4:  Safeguard integrity in financial reporting 
• Require the chief executive officer (or equivalent) and the chief financial 
officer (or equivalent) to state in writing to the board that the company’s 
financial reports present a true and fair view, in all material respects, of the 
company’s financial condition and operational results and are in accordance 
with relevant accounting standards. 
• The board should establish an audit committee. 
• Structure the audit committee so that it consists of only non-executive directors, 
a majority of independent directors, an independent chairperson, who is not 
chairperson of the board, and has at least three members. 
• The audit committee should have a formal charter. 
 
Principle 5:  Make timely and balanced disclosures 
• Establish written policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with 
ASX Listing Rule disclosure requirements and to ensure accountability at a 
senior management level for that compliance. 
 
Principle 6:  Respect the rights of shareholders 
• Design and disclose a communications strategy to promote effective 
communication with shareholders and encourage effective participation at 
general meetings. 
• Request the external auditor to attend the annual general meeting and be 
available to answer shareholder questions about the conduct of the audit and the 
preparation and content of the auditor’s report. 
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Principle 7:  Recognise and manage risk 
• The board or appropriate board committee should establish policies on risk 
oversight and management. 
• The chief executive officer (or equivalent) and the chief financial officer (or 
equivalent) should state to the board in writing that (i) the statement given in 
accordance with best practice recommendation 4.1 (the integrity of financial 
statements) is founded on a sound system of risk management and internal 
compliance and control which implements the policies adopted by the board, 
and (ii) the company’s risk management and internal compliance and control 
system is operating efficiently and effectively in all material respects. 
 
Principle 8:  Encourage enhanced performance 
• Disclose the process for performance evaluation of the board, its committees 
and individual directors, and key executives. 
 
Principle 9:  Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
• Provide disclosure in relation to the company’s remuneration policies to enable 
investors to understand (i) the costs and benefits of those policies and (ii) the 
link between remuneration paid to directors and key executives and corporate 
performance. 
• The board should establish a remuneration committee. 
• Clearly distinguish the structure of non-executive directors’ remuneration from 
that of executives. 
• Ensure that payment of equity-based executive remuneration is made in 
accordance with thresholds set in plans approved by shareholders. 
 
Principle 10:  Recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders 
• Establish and disclose a code of conduct to guide compliance with legal and 
other obligations to legitimate stakeholders. 
 
The Council (p. 5) states that the principles are ‘not prescriptions’ but 
designed to ‘produce an efficiency, quality or integrity outcome’.  However, all 
companies listed on the stock exchange (and potential listing companies) are 
encouraged to use the principles for ‘re-examining their corporate governance 
practices’.  Companies may opt-out of implementing recommendations by clearly 
stating why they are not adopting the particular recommendation.  Whether 
companies will avail themselves of such an option will depend on the transaction 
costs involved in explaining ‘why not’.  We might conjecture that the potential 
negative market reaction to such an explanation would deter most firms from such 
behaviour. 
The principles can be organised into three types:  structural principles, 
behavioural principles and disclosure principles.   
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Structural Principles 
The structural principles assume that corporate governance mechanisms matter for 
the performance of the firm and the achievement of the firm’s goals.  These 
principles dictate the ideal composition of the board of directors (principles 2.1 
and 2.2) and separation of roles on the board (principle 2.3), for the existence and 
structure of board committees (principles 2.4, 4.2, 4.3 and 9.2) and the operation 
of annual general meetings (encouraging effective participation — principle 6.1, 
and the use of auditors — principle 6.2). 
The review in the previous section showed that structure alone does not 
necessarily lead to better governance although it influences the context of decision 
making.  So the effectiveness of the structural principles will depend on how they 
influence behaviour.  Further, the empirical evidence supporting the structural 
principles is mixed.  The underlying assumption that governance structures matter 
for firm performance has been dismissed by most financial economists (for 
example, Bhagat and Black, 1998; Demsetz and Villonga, 2001).  The weight of 
empirical evidence shows that board structure (such as a majority of independent 
non-executive directors) and/or that separation of board roles (such as between the 
chair and CEO positions) is unrelated to better average financial performance, 
other things being equal.  There is, however, evidence that the operation of boards 
improves around important events (such as poor performance, CEO dismissal) and 
on certain key decisions-making issues (such as CEO remuneration, auditor 
appointment) when the board has a majority of independent non-executive 
directors.  The number of non-executive directors in Australia are positively 
associated with the likelihood of CEO dismissal and negatively associated with 
excess CEO remuneration (Suchard, Singh, and Barr, 2001; Fleming and Stellios, 
2002).  Thus, we cannot expect to observe better financial outcomes for equity and 
debt holders as a result of adopting the principles on structure.  Behavioural 
change is also necessary. 
Behavioural Principles 
Behavioural principles form the majority of the Council’s recommendations.  The 
behavioural approach assumes that adherence to structure in itself (a compliance 
oriented ‘box-ticking’) does not necessarily lead to better governance.  This 
assumption is consistent with the review in the previous section, the empirical 
finance literature, and with a wider set of arguments developed in law and 
economics.  The principles relating to the relative roles of the board and 
executives (principle 1.1), codes of conduct and charters (principles 3.1, 4.4 and 
10.1), the necessity for sign-off of financial accounts and risk management 
policies (principles 4.1, 3.2, 5.1, 7.1, 7.2), and development of remuneration 
policies (principles 9.3 and 9.4) are designed to influence the behaviour of the 
management of major listed firms and generate positive spillovers in terms of 
changes in behaviour to all firms.   
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The setting of principles to influence behaviour (to achieve compliance in 
spirit as well as in the letter of the law) draws upon the theory associated with 
‘expressive law’ — that by expressing a desired behaviour one can encourage the 
occurrence of that behaviour; see Cooter, 1998; Sunstein, 1996).  Firms adopting 
the new principles will encourage a move to a new set of behaviour by 
management of ‘non-adopters’.  Thus, a compliance culture is transaction cost 
minimising; even more so when non-compliance may require greater resources 
being devoted to explain the case for opting-out, or lead to falls in the firm’s share 
price as investors exit. 
Disclosure Principles 
Each of the 10 ASX principles has an associated disclosure principle, which 
outlines how the firm is to communicate corporate governance information to the 
stock market.  In addition, disclosure is required on share trading (principle 3.2), 
the process of evaluating the board and senior executives (principle 8.1) and 
remuneration details (principle 9.1).  The assumption behind the disclosure 
principles is that more information is better than less, and the operation of an 
efficient stock market requires material information to be disclosed in a timely 
fashion.  This is consistent with the operation of the continuous disclosure rules 
since they were adopted in 1996. 
It is not the case that all market participants are equal in their ability to 
comprehend the implications of new information on corporate governance 
practices for the value of the firm.  We observe trading over-reactions to many 
types of information releases by different shareholders, including key strategic 
events such as mergers and acquisitions, which should be relatively straight-
forward to assess (see Aitken and Czernowski, 1992).  Thus, we can expect greater 
volatility in market reactions to corporate governance announcements in the 
future, until market learning allows the information to be processed efficiently.  
Such learning will take time.  For example, the disclosure of the remuneration 
packages of senior executives often attracts media attention and comparisons with 
national wage averages (especially the absolute dollar amount of the salary, 
bonuses or termination payments).  Students of executive remuneration will be 
aware that the determination of an equilibrium remuneration package is a non-
trivial task.  Many variables go into the setting of wages, including firm size, firm 
risk, organisational complexity, and financial performance, as well as human 
capital factors such as industry experience, and education (Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker, 1999).  Similarly, termination payments (or golden parachutes) have been 
shown to increase shareholder welfare (Lefanowicz, Robinson and Smith, 2000).  
The disclosure principles improve the ability of groups within the firm’s nexus of 





Corporate governance reforms such as those provided by the Principles of the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council are welcome additions to the rules and 
regulations that form the legal boundaries to firm behaviour.  But the important 
policy implication is that we should not expect the management of firms to alter 
governance structures and behaviour overnight.  Such an expectation is unrealistic 
given that structural change in itself will not lead to better outcomes for 
shareholders, debt holders or other stakeholders of the firm.  Behavioural change 
is a longer term process. 
One unfortunate side-effect of the focus on corporate governance is that 
market participants (such as large institutional investors) and policy makers are 
calling for a faster response to the apparent failures.  Our review of the last forty 
years shows it is not easy to judge whether the state of corporate governance has 
improved.  Thus, short term responses to calls for reform may lack the careful 
reflection on what structures and behaviour are appropriate for the firms and its 
stakeholders, given the overriding goal of efficient resource allocation and 
maximising long term shareholder wealth.  Certainly, rules on the behaviour of 
senior executives and the board will encourage oscillation to a particular structural 
and behavioural equilibrium.  Firms should not be penalised, however, if they find 
alternative solutions to solving coordination and governance problems associated 
with the separation of ownership and control. 
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